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In the Supreme Co·urt 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE N. CANNON, doing busi-
ness as INTERMOUNTAIN SUP-
PLY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
B. K. TUFT, 
Defenda;nt and Appellant. 
Case No. 8292 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the consent of the Plaintiff the Trial Court 
granted the Defendant's motion to vacate the judgment 
mentioned in Defendant's brief so as to eliminate any 
question involving, judgment which had been entered 
and in order to give the Defendant the opportunity to 
answer and to present his evidence at a trial on the merits 
of the case. 
Counsel for Defendant, on pages 2 and 4 of his brief, 
st~te~ th~t the only issue presented ·by this appeal is 
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whether or not the rrrial Court erred in refusing the 
Defendant's several nwtions to disn1iss for irnproper 
venue. 
We take it, therefore, that this Court will not wish 
to bother itself with the other questions which counsel 
for the Defendant spends so n1uch time on in his brief 
which do not pertain to the question of venue. 
As counsel for the Defendant has done for con-
venience we also will refer to the parties as Plaintiff 
and· Defendant, the same as they are referred to in the 
lower Court. 
This action was commenced in the District Court in 
and For Salt Lake County by a complaint showing upon 
its face that the Defendant was a resident of Salina, 
Utah, and had defaulted on a contract. (R. p. 1). 
The Defendant filed a timely Motion to Dismiss on 
the ground that the Defendant is a resident of Sevier 
County, Utah, but did not -ask fo·r a change of venue. On 
August 30, 1954, Plaintiff mailed a notice to the Defend-
ant that on September 9, 1954, the Plaintiff would call 
up for final disposition Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Defendant failed to appear at the hearing of the 
motion and the District Court, on September 9, 1954, 
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and designated no 
time within which the Defendant would have to answer. 
On September 9, 1954, (R. p. 3) Plaintiff mailed no-
tice -to Defendant of said denial of Motion to Dismiss. 
The questions counsel talks about as. to enry of judg-
ment are immaterial because the judgment was set aside 
and· the Defendant was given an opportunity to answer. 
I 
1 
l 
' 
~ 
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Later, '"ithin the time required, Defendant filed his 
Answer in which as a First Defense he raises the ques-
tion of improper venue, and as his Second Defense, a 
general traverse and denial of the allegations of Plain-
tiff'~ complaint. (R. p. 10) 
As stated by the Defendant in his brief he filed a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal asking that the ques-
tion of venue he determined ·by this Court (R. pp. 11-17). 
The petition was granted February 7, 1955. (R. p. 18). 
The Court will notice as above stated from Defen-
dant's Motion to Dismiss THAT DEFENDANT 
:MERELY ASKED FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CASE 
AND DID NOT ASK FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
IMPROPER VENUE, NOR IN REFUSING TO RE-HEAR THE 
QUESTION OF VENUE, NOR IN ORDERING THE DEFEND-
ANT-APPELLANT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IF HE VviSHED TO PROCEED WITH THE CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
IMPROPER VENUE, NOR IN REFUSING TO RE-HEAR THE 
QUESTION OF VENUE, NOR IN ORDERING THE DEFEND-
ANT-APPELLANT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IF HE WISHED TO PROCEED WITH THE CASE. 
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In his argument the defendant states that he "has 
exhausted every effort to avail hiinself of the substantial 
right of trial in the county of his residence" but the 
defendant did not Inake a timely application in com-
pliance with the statutes of the State of Utah for a change 
of venue. ln fact, he never did Inake an application for 
a change of venue but merely filed a nwtion to dismiss 
the case which would have put the plaintiff to the ex-
pense of re-filing the case in the county of defendant's 
residence which is not contemplated by the Utah statutes. 
This Utah statute is Sec. 78-13-8, Utah Code Anno. 
1953, which is entitled: 
''Change of venue-Conditions precedent. If 
the county in which the action is commenced is 
not the proper county for the trial thereof, the 
action may nevertheless be tried therein, unless 
the defendant at the time he answers o·r otherwise 
appears files a motion, in writing, that the trial 
be had in the proper county." (Underscoring 
added). 
We call the attention of the Court to the words in the 
heading of this statute-'' Conditions precedent.'' These 
conditions precedent are (1) the defendant must make 
the request at the time he answers or otherwise appears; 
(2) he must file a motion in writing that the trial be had 
in the proper county. The ·Court will notice that the 
wording of the statute does not allow a dismissal of the 
case but merely a change of place of trial. This is done 
apparently for the purpose of saving the plaintiff the 
expense of the court costs in re-filing the case if it were 
dis:missed. There are many reasons why, if the place of 
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5 
trial is going to be changed, all parties should know about 
it when the defendant appears. Apparently the legisla-
ture did not want to allow the case to proceed and give 
the defendant the right at any time he chose to disturb 
the situation and all parties concerned ·by asking for a 
change of place of trial after answer or otherwise 
appearing. Such a rule would cause great confusion and 
uncertainty for the courts as well as the parties in litiga-
tion. 
Counsel for defendant tries to make a lot of the 
case of Buckle v. Ogden Furniture and Carpet Co., 61 
Utah 559, 216 P. 684, 'but in this case while the court 
held that the defendant was entitled to a change of venue 
because of defendant's residence being in Weber County 
while the case was filed in Salt Lake County, the defend-
ant filed a motion for change of venue at the time he 
answered which motion was erroneously denied. The 
Court held: 
''It is, therefore, the conclusion of the Court 
that actions upon contracts not in writing upon 
proper and timely demand being made must be 
tried in the county where one of the defendants 
reside. 
"In construing the statute the legislative in-
tent is to be determined from a general view of 
the whole act with reference to the subject matter 
to which it applies and it is a cardinal rule that 
effect is to be given if possible to every word, 
clause and sentence and so far as practicable 
reconcile the different provisions so as to make 
them consistent and harmoneous and to give a 
sensible and intelligent effect to each." (Under-
scoring added). 
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This rule is laid down by Judge Frick in Board of 
Education, vs. Bryner, 57 U. 78, 192 P. 627 in which he 
said: 
"It is * * * necessary * * * that every 
word and every phrase must be given some force 
and effect * * * notwithstanding* * * the statutes 
may thereby be enlarged or restricted.'' 
Counsel makes the mistake of comparing the .prac-
tice of the Federal Court with our practice. In the 
Federal practice the courts do not have a statute worded 
as our Sec. 78-13-8, above referred to, and, consequently, 
any rule the Federal Courts may have would not logically 
be applicable to our practice in which we are bound by 
the wording of our Utah statute. 
See Barron & Holtzoff~ Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, Volume 1, Section 71, 86, 87 and 354. In said 
Section 71, at page 135, the following language is used: 
''Venue is governed by acts of congress * • * 
venue is not affected by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.'' 
Said Section 86, at page 164, uses the following language: 
"Congress in 1948 Revision of the Judicial 
Code, has provided for a change of venue in the 
District Courts 'for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses in the interest of j'UStice.' ". 
In said Section 354, page 636, the following language 
is used: 
"A motion to dismiss was formerly the only 
method by which to raise the objection to forum 
non conveniens, ·but by statute the District Courts 
now have authority to transfer any case to a 
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7 
forum more convenient to the parties and wit-
nesses if transfer is in the interest of justice.'' 
wrherefore, the cases formerly decided on 
motion to dismiss though no longer authority for 
dismissal may, still serve some useful purpose 
on motions for change of venue under the statute 
to indicate the scope of the doctrine and the 
Court's discretion * * *" 
Even in the Federal practice the rule now is to file 
a motion for change of venue rather than ask for dis-
missal of the case as the foregoing language indicates. 
It seems to us very clearly that counsel is without 
authority either in our State or in the Federal courts 
to show that he had the right to a dismissal of 
the case. He should have filed a motion for change of 
venue in a timely manner and he would, without question, 
have had the right to a change of venue but we take the 
position that he lost that opportunity by failing to re-
quest it in writing in a timely manner which is a con-
dition precedent to the Court granting him a change 
of venue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. CANNON 
623 Continental Bank Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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